Washington, Moscow, Tehran and Riyadh: The Coming Conflict over the Middle East

There are, at the present moment, four game plans colliding with each other in a terrain filled with hidden mines. The sum of the collusion will be totally different than the objectives of each of the players. Worst, no one has the ability to predict the outcome, not even the players themselves.

Let us examine briefly each game plan as seen by each player before addressing, in general, the potential paths of this dangerous game.

Saudi Arabia:

From the Saudi perspective, Iran has gone too far. Ideologically, Tehran enshrined the export of its revolution into its constitution. Practically, it has the Quds Force of the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) to make sure that this principle is implemented. Furthermore, it achieved progress through infiltrating Iraq after the US-UK ill-advised invasion and it moved and it is actively present in Damascus now. This came after successfully creating Hezbollah in Lebanon and was followed by the Houthi rebellion in Yemen and the control over Sana’a. The Shia Crescent developed into a full moon.

Signs of additional progress of pro-Iranian forces in the Arab World are scattered here and there to threaten even more of the same. Terrorist attacks by these forces are becoming more and more a normal occurrence in many Gulf Arab countries. Bahraini Shias were encouraged to revolt. And Tehran broke free of its isolation after harvesting all possible profits of its illegal nuclear activities.

All the while, the US, which used to be the guarantor of the regional security order, showed signs of changing directions. Washington pursued what it deemed its interests by opening channels with Tehran, pulling its forces from Iraq prematurely, zigzagging in Syria before it finally offers to work with Moscow to preserve Assad and letting down some of its loyal rulers in a moment of need.

The US zigzag on Syria and the Iranian successful offensive in Iraq made the Saudis nervous. Allowing this trend of Iranian expansion was obviously promising to put the Kingdom under siege and deprive it of any strategic depth in the Near East.

This compelled the Saudis to either surrender to the mounting Iranian intervention or take the initiative, regardless of what its traditional allies in Washington do, to what it has to do stop the Iranian wave.

Iran:

During the years of sanctions and isolation, Tehran regarded intervention in Iraq and Lebanon as a national security priority. Ideology in revolutionary-Iran is not reduced to superficial rhetoric. It is a tool to mobilize the Shias in and out of Iran. It also gives the IRGC substantial powers and profits. Furthermore, it is useable as a national interest tool. It is wrong to assume that Iranian or IRGC leaders act or pretend when they are talking about their regional cause. They sincerely believe their own rhetoric so long as there is nothing, in worldly interests, that compels them to question its validity. It does not only sound self-righteous, it is also profitable.

IRGC leaders and a good portion of Iran’s “establishment” and clergy, believes they have a responsibility towards “the oppressed” (mostazafin) in the Islamic World. They believe that most Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are reactionary, pro-West, perpetually conspiring against their Islamic revolution, supporters of terrorism, oppressive of their Shia minorities, weakening Muslims and therefore should be toppled.

Of all these accusations, some stand in the forefront. Those are the ones that directly hinder the Iranian game plane. For example, Tehran believes that the US presence in the region is both threatening and an obstacle to regaining what Tehran believes its right to become a regional major power.

Iran adapts its message in Arab countries according the peculiarities of each situation. The Quds Force plays an Arab nationalist card in Lebanon through Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah and in Syria through Bashar al-Assad, but it plays a sectarian card in Iraq through Nouri al –Maliki and the some factions in the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF). In Yemen, they play an “independence” card and in other countries they play a “democratic” card.

The game plan of Tehran is based on a self-justified intervention in its western neighbors. Ideology and national interests come hand in hand to provide the base of this strategy.

Russia:

There are two conflicting views when it comes to understanding Moscow’s game plan in the Middle East. The first view looks at Russian policies as a reaction to a long-standing Western strategy to minimize Russia’s influence and hurt its national interests. Moreover, this view sees that President Putin’s intentions in the region and beyond stem from his desire to make the world recognize Russia as a major player and deal with it in respect and parity.

The other view looks at Russia’s assertive role and its occasional use or threat of military actions as an attempt to turn the global order upside down and as violation of international treaties. Russia is viewed, from this standpoint, as a global force which is systematically ready to use subversion and military action to further its global agenda. As such, it should be treated as a hostile power from the point of view of the existing global order.

In the Middle East, Russia helped Assad through direct military intervention, an act that furthered the Iranian game plan. It played an important role in reaching the nuclear deal with Tehran, which led to ending Iranian global isolation. And it is currently eyeing some important energy projects, particularly in Central and South Asia with Tehran. Furthermore, Moscow is monitoring how the political map in the Middle East will evolve, and how this will impact potential natural gas routs to the Mediterranean and from there to West Europe in the future. Clearly, Moscow has a genuine interest in shaping the outcome in a way

Moscow is using its role in the region as a bargaining chip in dealing with the major global powers. This classical game is yielding some positive results as we saw in the Obama administration recent offer to Moscow in regard to Syria. It also used its role there to gain favor with the Europeans while under pressure from the so called refugee crisis.

Russia is inviting GCC investment to the North Caucasus region in an attempt to stem the growth of religious radicalism through improvements in the region’s economic conditions. One essential reason for Moscow’s involvement in the Middle East is to stop the spread of Jihadists from the source. But the way they play their hands there may bring about some opposite results.

The US:

We have covered US Middle East policies extensively in previous issues of MEB. We see this policy as utter failure to adapt to contingent circumstances stemming either from limits on US abilities or the rapid roller coaster in the region. From the Arabs standpoint, the structure of US interests has shifted the moment the nuclear deal was signed. The temptation of wining Iran back as an ally was blinding US officials.

The straw that broke the camel’s back was the recent offer made by the US to cooperate with Russia to defeat a dangerous group of the Syrian opposition, freeze the issue of transition in Syria, accept Assad for the time being and focus on reducing violence and humanitarian assistance.

This offer enraged the relevant Arab capitals. It is considered a retreat from previous commitments and a reward to Assad and Iran. It alerted the Arab countries to the possibility that president Obama may be moving to bind the next administration with a policy favorable to Tehran.

Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir hat an unscheduled meeting with Secretary John Kerry on July 7 to inform him, according to State Department official statement, that Riyadh is ready to send ground troops to Syria. Al-Jubeir, however, explained the Saudi opposition to any deal between Moscow and Washington that endangers the roadmap agreed upon in Geneva. Even taking the Department’s statement at face value shown the degree of contrast between two allies, one talking about a deal to bomb the Syrian opposition and preserve Assad, and the other talking about sending troops to support the opposition and topple Assad.

The meeting was between Jubeir and Kerry was followed by a fiery speech given by former chief of Saudi Intelligence Prince Turki al-Faisal to tens of thousands of Mujahedeen Khalq in the “Free Iran” conference in Paris July 9. During the speech, the Saudi former official responded to thousands chanting “down with the regime” by saying: “me too, I want this regime down”. He also promised the opponents of the Ayatollahs with “a certain victory”.

When Saudis wave again the possibility of sending ground troops and take a visible stand in support of Iranian opposition, this means they are indeed running out of patience and ready to escalate.

This game is going on while the region is going through general transformation based on mounting popular discontent. The strategic competition, explained above, generates a tide of sectarian polarization. When Sectarian incitement is intensively projected on societies searching for channels to gather and direct their discontent, it threatens to deviate any popular movement to a confrontation based on sectarian perspectives. This will further tear the region apart and prevent it from progressing in a constructive manner.

We are inching towards a general regional escalation in the Middle East. The four game planes currently colliding in that region are going each in its path based on separate calculations. We do not have a global superpower that is willing or able to see the risks and intervene rapidly to create an area of compromise. None of the four parties will achieve a clean win. For in those cases there is no such thing as a clear win. But so far, the inertia seems to be unstoppable.